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In this paper we develop a monopolistic competition model where firms exercise their market power
across multiple products. Even with CES preferences, markups are endogenous. Firms choose their
optimal product scope by balancing the net profits from a new variety against the costs of "cannibalizing"
their own sales. With identical costs across firms, opening trade leads to fewer firms surviving in each
country but more varieties produced by each of those firms. With heterogeneous costs, the number
of firms surviving in equilibrium is quite insensitive to the market size. When trade is opened, more
firms initially enter, but the larger market size reduces the cannibalization effect and expands the optimal
scope of products. As a result, the less efficient firms exit, and the larger market is accommodated
by more efficient firms that produce more varieties per firm on average.
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  Recent literature in trade has begun to explore multiproduct firms. As documented by 
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006a), 41 percent of U.S. manufacturing firms produce in 
multiple 5-digit SIC industries, accounting for 91 percent of total sales. Using a large and unique 
dataset that contains product UPC barcodes, Broda and Weinstein (2007) also show that the 
majority of product creation and destruction happens within the boundaries of the firm. The 
concentration of sales in very large, multiproduct firms is even more apparent when we look at 
their exports sales. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2007) show that the top one percent of U.S. 
trading firms account for over 80 percent of total trade in 2000. Over 10 percent of exporters and 
20 percent of importers are trading 10 or more harmonized system (HS) products, and these 
firms account for about 90 percent of export and import value. Furthermore, these authors show 
that the variation in the number of exporters and exported products per firm explain most of the 
“gravity” results in trade: these two variables decline sharply with distance, and increase with 
importer income, whereas the average export value (per product and per firm) is actually 
increasing in distance and decreasing in importer income. Thus, the extensive margin of 
exporting firms is explaining much of the variation in the value of exports. 
  On the theoretical side, multiproduct firms have received attention for some years in the 
industrial organization literature (e.g., Brander and Eaton, 1984). The earliest paper we are aware 
of in the trade literature is Helpman (1985), who analyzes how a multinational will expand over 
multiple product lines. Like later authors, Helpman does not take into account the implied effect 
on the markups of the firms, but uses the constant-elasticity CES assumption with constant 
markups. Specifically, he assumed that the demand facing a firm producing product j is:    
      




where η is the elasticity of demand. The constant k would normally depend on the CES price 
index for the market, which leads to higher markups for multiproduct firms and also a 
“cannibalization” effect of increasing product varieties. By holding k constant, multiproduct 
firms charge the same markup as single product firms and do not consider the “cannibalization” 
effect. Instead, Helpman relies on diseconomies of scope to limit firms’ expansion into new 
product lines. 
  The simplification of Helpman (1985) also occurs in more recent literature dealing with 
CES preferences. Brambilla (2006) presents an application of the Melitz (2003) model to 
investigate the introduction of new varieties by multiproduct firms, with empirical application to 
multinationals in China. She ignores the interaction in demand of the products produced by a 
firm, using constant markups like Helpman. Similarly, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006b) 
theoretically investigate multiple products using a Melitz approach, but assume that a firm’s 
products are in different categories of goods, so there is no “cannibalization” effect in demand 
and markups are constant. Allanson and Montagna (2005) propose a multiproduct version of the 
standard Dixit-Stiglitz model using nested two-tier CES preferences, but again ignore the 
interaction of multiple products in demand. 
  Departing from CES preferences, Nocke and Yeaple (2006) use a partial equilibrium 
inverse demand curve P(q) for every product produced by a firm. They likewise do not take into 
account the effect of increases in a firm’s varieties on the demand for its existing products. They 
also assume decreasing returns to the range of products: the marginal cost of each variety is 
increasing in the number of varieties managed by one firm. That approach allows for a solution 
for the range of production for each firm, even without any interaction in demand. 




literature to allow for “cannibalization” effects with multiple products per firm, at least in a CES 
setting. Endogenous markups have been introduced using alternative preferences: in particular, 
the linear-quadratic utility function from Melitz and Ottaviano (2005). Eckel and Neary (2006) 
use that approach and no longer treat the aggregate output (or price) index as exogenous. Instead, 
markups are endogenous and a cannibalization effect operates since a larger output of one variety 
tends to lower the demand for all other varieties. This gives multiproduct firms an incentive to 
restrict its range of varieties. Eckel and Neary (2006) also introduce an incentive on the cost side, 
whereby each firm has a core competence in one particular variety, and the marginal cost of a 
new variety is greater, the more distant it deviates from the “core competence.” 
  In comparison, our model returns to the conventional CES preferences but relaxes the 
constant aggregate price index assumption. We will show that it is both tractable and interesting 
to remove this assumption. Initially, we solve for the equilibrium in a model where firms have 
identical costs, in the spirit of the early work of Krugman (1979, 1980), but allowing for multiple 
products per firms. That identical-cost model is closest to the business group model of Feenstra, 
Huang and Hamilton (2003) and Feenstra and Hamilton (2006). In that work, a group of firms 
(or equivalently, a firm with multiple products) jointly maximized profits in upstream and 
downstream markets, choosing optimal prices and product scope in each, and free entry of 
groups was assumed. It turns out the multiple equilibria are present in the model, with different 
organizations of the business groups.
1 That result followed from the simultaneous upstream and 
                                                 
1  An economy with given parameters can permit a strongly vertically-integrated equilibrium, with a small number 
of very large groups, charging high prices for their sale of intermediate inputs; or a less-integrated equilibrium, with 
a large number of smaller groups, charging lower prices for their intermediate inputs. The former high-concentration 
equilibrium was compared to the large business groups known as chaebol in South Korea, while the latter low-




downstream competition between groups. The model presented in this paper departs from 
Feenstra and Hamilton by assuming that firms produce and sell in only the downstream sector,  
and by focusing on the comparison of autarky to international trade. 
  After analyzing the model with identical costs, we turn to a version of the model where 
firms have heterogeneous costs, as in Melitz (2003). Firms still choose their range of products 
optimally, and for that reason, cannot be treated as “small” relative to the market. The solution to 
the model cannot use the law of large numbers as applied by Melitz (2003); instead, we analyze 
the equilibrium with a combination of analytical and numerical results. We show analytically 
that the optimal number of varieties takes an inverted U-shape with respect to their market 
shares: the greatest range of product varieties is produced by firms with a mid-level of market 
share. When trade is opened, the larger market size reduces the cannibalization effect and 
expands the optimal scope of products. We show numerically that the number of firms in 
equilibrium is rather insensitive to the market size, but less efficient firms are forced to exit due 
to trade, so the larger market is accommodated by more efficient firms that produce more 
varieties per firm on average. 
 
2. Preferences and Demand 
  There are L consumers (workers) in the economy, each endowed with one unit of labor. 
The utility function is: 
                                                  ) Y ln( y U 0 ρ + = ,    1 < ρ ,                                     (1) 
where  0 y  is the consumption of an outside good which is treated as numeraire. Y represents the 
consumption index for the horizontally differentiated products. As often used in the monopolistic 






















= ∫ ,       (2) 
where  ) i ( y  is the quantity consumed of variety i, 1 > η  is the elasticity of substitution between 
output varieties, and N is the total number of varieties.  
  We will assume that each firm j=1,…,M produces a positive mass of products Nj > 0. 
Without loss of generality, we arrange the order of products so that firm 1 produces the first N1 
varieties, firm 2 produces the next N2 varieties, etc. Letting  ∑ = ≡
M
1 j j N N  denote the total mass 
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  The market for the numeraire good  0 y  is competitive, and production requires one unit of 
labor for each unit of output, implying that the wage rate  1 w = . Utility maximization under the 
typical budget constraint gives the familiar form of aggregate demand for each variety within the 
differentiated good sector,
 2 
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where  L R ρ =  denotes the aggregate expenditure on this sector, and the price index P is, 
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Each firm j chooses the continuum of prices  ) i ( p  for its product varieties of mass Nj. We 
simplify this optimal control problem by assuming that each firm has the same marginal cost for 
all its varieties, so it charges the same price for them. Letting  ) i ( p pj =  for firm j’s mass of Nj  
varieties, then the aggregate price index in (4) can be written as,  
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Notice that a change in pj for firm j will affect the aggregate price index P, provided that the 
mass of products Nj produced by firm j is strictly positive. Differentiating (3), the elasticity of 
demand for each variety  ) i ( y yj =  produced by firm j, with respect to the price pj, is: 
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where  j s  denotes the market share of its products: 




















s  .                                            (6) 
We see from (5) and (6) that the elasticity of demand differs from η whenever Nj > 0. Moreover, 
larger firms face lower demand elasticity.  
 
3. Production with Identical Costs 
  Firms maximize profits by choosing optimal prices  j p  and product range  j N :  
                       max




where k0 is a fixed “headquarters cost”, k1 is the fixed cost of adding a marginal product into the 
product line, and j y  is the demand for the variety, with marginal cost φ and price  j p . In this 
section the costs are identical across firms, while in sections 4 and 5 we will introduce 
heterogeneity in marginal costs, like Melitz (2003). 
  To choose its optimal price, the firm takes the aggregate price index into consideration 
when making pricing decision, so its perceived price elasticity of demand is no longer a constant 
but equals that shown in (5) and (6). Then the optimal choice of  j p is: 
















j  .                                                (8) 
Thus, the demand elasticity and the markup are both endogenously determined. As implied by 
(5) and (8), a firm with higher market share would face less elastic demand and therefore be able 
to set higher markups.    
  Optimization over the product range Nj gives: 
              1 j j j j j k ) p ( y s ) p ( y = φ − − φ − .                          (9) 
The first term on the left of (9) gives the marginal benefit of adding a marginal variety. But 
adding this variety will reduce the demand for other varieties produced by the same firm, which 
is shown by the second term on the left. The larger the market share of the firm, the more severe 
is this “cannibalization effect”.  
  We can use (8) in (9) to obtain: 




Condition (10) can be recognized as the zero-profit condition in a CES model with single 
product firms, when the markup is  ) 1 /( − η η   and the fixed costs are 1 k . In our model, it follows 
from the first-order conditions for price and the scope of varieties.  
  The optimum number of varieties is obtained by writing firm j’s market share as: 
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where the second equality follows from (8) and the third equality from (10).  Firm j’s optimal 
scope is then given by: 
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=     ,     (12) 
where R is the total market expenditure with  L R ρ = .  
  We will use the subscript “0” to denote the free entry equilibrium, which satisfies: 
   0 ) N k k ( ) p ( y N 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 = + − φ − = Π .      ( 1 3 )  
Multiplying the equality in (9) by N0, we get: 
                  0 N k ) s 1 )( p ( y N 0 1 0 0 0 0 = − − φ − .        ( 1 4 )  
Then comparing (13) and (14), we obtain: 








= − ,                              (15) 
from which we obtain another (implicit) solution for the equilibrium number of varieties for each 
firm: 


















  We still need to solve for the market share in the zero-profit equilibrium. Notice that with 
identical firms, all active firms will end up with the same market share. Using (8) and (12), firm 
j’s optimized profits can be rewritten as: 
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= Π  .                                                    (17) 
In the zero-profit equilibrium, (17) becomes: 
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− η − η
= Π ,                                             (18) 
which gives an expression for  0 s:  
      
R 2
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=                                   (19) 
  The firms’ market share,  0 s , is a function of the market size R = ρL and the headquarters 
cost  0 k . An increase in the country size L leads to a lower level of zero-profit market share s0. 
On the other hand, a larger headquarter cost requires a larger cutoff market share and thus an 
upward impact on active firms’ market shares (recall all firms have the same market share). That 
is:
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  .                                                     (20) 
  Taking in to account the endogeneity of the market shares s0, using (16) we can also 
obtain the impact of the market size L and the headquarters investment  0 k  on the range of 
products for each firm: 
                                                 


















.     ( 2 1 )  
The headquarters fixed costs leads to a higher market share for the zero-profit firm in (20): it 
must be selling a positive mass of product N0 > 0 with market share s0 > 0 in order to cover the 
fixed costs k0 > 0. As market size grows, however, the fixed costs are then relatively less 
important, and the borderline market share s0 falls. But the range of products N0 produced by the 
borderline firm continues to grow. The indeterminacy of the impact of the headquarters 
investment k0 on the range of products N0 comes from the indeterminacy of the relationship 
between N0 and s0: when  0 k  is low, relatively more firms could stay in the market (each takes a 
small share, see (22) below), so an increase in  0 k  would require a rise in the market share of 
each firm, resulting in variety expansion of each active firm; but when only a few firms are in the 
market (each takes a substantial share), an increase in  0 k  would again raise the market share, but 
this time leading to an reduction in variety range. This corresponds to the “cannibalization 
effect” of the with-firm brand competition: when the currently existing brands already take a 
large share in the market, it may not be wise to add another brand since it subtracts demand from 
other brands of the same firm more than from other competitors. 
  The number of firms active in equilibrium is readily solved from,  
       1 Ms0 = ,                                                  (22) 
so that  0 s / 1 M = .  It follows from (20) that: 

















An increase in country size (due to the opening of trade) leads to lower market share  0 s  and as a 
result, the total number of firms M in the equilibrium is increasing in market size. The intuition 
for this result is similar to that discussed just above: as market size grows, the fixed costs become 
relatively less important, so the market share s0 of the zero-profit firms falls. As a result, there is 
room for more firms in the market.  
                  We can follow Krugman (1979) to obtain a solution for the number of firms in each 
country from the full-employment condition. The total labor input required for each firm j is: 
                                                    ) y k ( N k L j 1 j 0 j φ + + = .                                                   (24)    
Notice that the total labor utilized in this industry is L ρ , so the total number of firms in each 
country is: 
                                  
1 0 0 j 1 j 0 j k N k
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= ,                                    (25)                      
where the first equality follows the full employment condition, the second equality applies the 
definition of labor usage, while the last equality is from (10) with all firms have the same product 
range 0 j N N =  in equilibrium.  
            Consider, now, the thought-experiment in Krugman (1979) where trade is opened 
between two identical countries. That leads to a doubling of the market size (i.e. from L to 2L), 
so from (23), the total number of firms selling to consumers increases compared to the number of 
firms in each country in autarky. Since an increase in market size stimulates firms to expand 
their varieties (from (21)), then from (25) we see the number of firms producing in each country 
necessarily falls with the opening of trade. This effect is also observed in Krugman (1979), but in 
his work, the existence of this effect is due to the more general specification of the utility (the 




single-product firms would make that effect disappear. In contrast, the CES utility function is 
still utilized in our model, while the endogeneity of the demand elasticity comes from our 
multiple-products-per-firm assumption.  
             These results are summarized by: 
 
Proposition 1 
With identical marginal costs and positive headquarters fixed costs, increasing the market size 
through international trade leads to: 
(a) the world number of surviving firms exceeds the number of firms  in either country in 
autarky, while the number of producing firms in each country falls after trade relative to 
the number in autarky; 
(b) an expansion in the range of varieties produced by each firm; 
(c) no change in the quantity supplied of each variety (from (10)); 
(d) an improvement in consumer welfare due to both (a) and (b). 
 
             It also worth noting that the welfare gains of consumers in part (d) come from the 
increases in total available varieties due to (a) and (b), which result in a fall in the price index 
defined in (4'). Besides this “love of variety” gain, each firm also charge lower markups due to 
the diminishing market share after trade (as L rises s0 falls in (20), which reduces prices), which 
is another source of gains from trade that is absent from conventional CES trade models. 
  Interestingly, after trade opening, while the number of local producers is reduced, they 






In the setting specified in Proposition 1, an increase in market size due to  trade leads to an 
expansion in the varieties produced by surviving firms that dominates the decrease in the number 
of local firms, so that the varieties produced in each country expands. 
Proof:  
From (25), the total number of varieties supplied by local producers is:  















= ,  
where M is the number of local producers, and N0 is the number of varieties produced by each 
firm. Opening trade leads to a larger N0, and hence a larger MN0.   QED 
  
4. Production with Heterogeneous Costs 
  We now assume that firms are heterogeneous in their marginal cost of production φ, as 
in Melitz (2003). For simplicity, we also assume no headquarters costs. We suppose that firms’ 
productivity  φ / 1  is drawn from a Pareto distribution with support  ) , / 1 [ max ∞ φ and with shape 
parameter γ. Thus the marginal cost φ follows the distribution specified as  γ φ φ = φ ) / ( ) ( F max , 
where  max φ  is the highest possible marginal costs.  Not all entrants will stay in the market and 
produce: firms with a high draw of marginal costs might not be profitable. In order to describe 
the equilibrium of the model, we need to be careful of the information that firms have and the 
timing of moves. 
  Specifically, in a short-run equilibrium we take as given the number of entering firms 
Me, which is a non-stochastic variable. Given Me, there will be a simultaneous and independent 
draw of marginal costs  ) ,..., , ( ) M (




common knowledge of the firms who have entered the market, and they will each choose their 
optimal prices according to the same first-order condition that we had earlier: 
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  Optimization over the product range Nj also gives a similar equation as before: 
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j j j j j j j    .                      (27) 
The first term on the left of (27) gives the marginal benefit of adding a marginal variety. But 
adding this variety will reduce the demand for other varieties produced by the same firm, which 
is shown by the second term on the left. The larger the market share of the firm, the more severe 
is this “cannibalization effect”. The net benefit should be balanced by the fixed costs of adding a 
marginal variety. But for very inefficient firms, their net benefit from adding an additional 
variety can never cover the corresponding fixed costs, hence we have the inequality specified in 
the second line on the right of (27).  
  Subject to these choices of price and product range, we will check whether the profits of 
all firms are non-negative. If not, then we assume that the highest-cost firm exits the market, and 
we check whether the profits for the remaining firms are all non-negative. If not, we assume that 
the next-highest cost firm exits the market, etc. This procedure is repeated until enough high-cost 
firms have exited so that the remaining firms have non-negative profits. We summarize this 






Given the number of entrants Me, a short-run equilibrium has prices and product ranges chosen 
according to (26) and (27), and exit of enough of the highest-cost firms so that the profits of the 
remaining firms are non-negative. 
 
  To see how the short-run equilibrium is computed in practice, suppose that firms j = 
1,2,…,M have positive profits with a positive choice of product range, so the equality in (27) 
holds. Then we can use that equality with (26) to obtain: 
                1 j j k ) 1 ( y − η = φ   .                 (28) 
From (28), and applying (3) and (26), we can readily solve for: 
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Suppose that firm j=0 earns zero profits and has  0 N0 =  and  0 s0 = , so (29) becomes:  
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  Condition (29') gives the marginal cost of the borderline firm that is just able to produce a 
single (or negligible share) of products, and still breaks even. We can compare (29) to (29') to get 
the relative costs of firms as related to their market shares: 
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Let  0 j j /φ φ = τ  denote the relative cost ratio, so lower τ represents higher productivity, from (30) 
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j   with  1 j ≤ τ .      (31)                         
Obviously  0 ) ( ' s j < τ , so more productive firm has larger market share. 
  Given the number of entrants Me, and the productivity draw  ) ,..., , ( ) M (
e M 2 1 e φ φ φ = φ , 
we can easily check whether these firms all earn non-negative profits by checking whether the 
markets shares implied by (31) add up to less than unity. That is, take the highest-cost firm 
among the j = 1,2,…,Me draws of productivity, labeled as j=0, and hypothesize that it earns zero 
profits with N0 = 0 and s0 = 0. Expressing all other relative marginal costs as  0 j j /φ φ = τ , then 
the market share for the remaining firms are computed from (31). If market shares sum to exactly 
unity, then we have found a short-run equilibrium. If the market shares sum to less than unity, 
then evidently all firms can stay in the market, but our initial hypothesis that profits are zero and 
s0 = 0 for the highest-cost firm is not true. Instead, that firm can have a positive market share s0 > 
0, in which case the market shares of the other firms are computed as: 
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which is derived in the same manner as (31) but allowing for a positive market share s0 > 0 for 
the highest-cost firm. Then the equilibrium is determined by solving for s0 from the equation: 
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   On the other hand, if the initial hypothesis that profits are zero with s0 = 0 for the highest-
cost firms results in a sum of market shares from (31) that exceeds unity, then the highest-cost 
firm cannot earn non-negative profits. So that the least efficient firm is dropped, and we take the 
firm with second-highest marginal costs, and hypothesize that it has zero profits with s0 = 0. We 
then check whether the sum of market shares in (31) of the remaining firms is less than or equal 
to unity. If the sum of market shares equals unity then we have found a short-run equilibrium; if 
it is less than unity then we use (33), but without the highest-cost firm, to determine the 
equilibrium; and if the sum is more than unity then we also need to drop the firm with second-
highest marginal costs. This procedure is repeated until we arrive at the number of firms 
e M M ≤  that survive in the short-run equilibrium for that particular draw of marginal costs 
) ,..., , ( ) M (
e M 2 1 e φ φ φ = φ .
4  In practice we will always have  e M M <  in equilibrium, so the 
market shares are determined by: 
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  ,           (33')          
where τj = 1 for the highest-cost firm that survives in equilibrium, with market share s0. 
  We are now in a position to identify the conditions that must be satisfied in the long-run 
equilibrium, where the expected profits of firms are non-positive. Using (12) (which still holds 
with heterogeneous costs) and (26), firm j’s optimized operating profit can be rewritten as: 
                                                 
4  Notice that the number of surviving firms is a random variable, depending on the draw of marginal costs, whereas 
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τ − − η +
τ
= τ ∏ ,                  (34)     
for any relative costs  j τ . We have already seen how the market shares determined in an short-
run equilibrium, and these can be used in (34) to determine profits for the surviving firms. Then 
the expected profits are computed by taking the average of (34) over firms and then taking the 
expected value over all draws of  ) ,..., , ( ) M (
e M 2 1 e φ φ φ = φ : 


















,                 (35)     
where we adopt the notation that  0 ) ( j = τ ∏  for all firms j = M+1,… Me that that do not survive 
in each short-run equilibrium. Notice that expected profits in (35) depend on the number of 
entrants Me in several ways: that number is the dimension of the productivity vector 
) ,..., , ( ) M (
e M 2 1 e φ φ φ = φ  which is drawn for each short-run equilibrium; and it is also used to 
form the average of profits in (35).  For the second reason, we expect that (35) is declining in the 
number of entering firms, at least as Me gets sufficiently large: too many entrants will lower the 




A long-run equilibrium is the smallest number of entering firm Me such that the expected profits 
in (35) is greater than or equal to the fixed cost of entry ke , but adding one more entrant, then 





  In practice, the long-run equilibrium is determined by taking repeated draws of the 
productivity vector  ) ,..., , ( ) M (
e M 2 1 e φ φ φ = φ , for given Me.  For each draw, we compute an 
short-run equilibrium, and its associated profits from (34). Averaged these over many draws, we 
obtain expected profits in (35). In order to determine the long-run equilibrium number of 
entrants, we would need to repeat this procedure for various choices of Me, until Definition 2 is 
satisfied. In practice, the numerical problem is simplified because for any choice of Me, the 
short-run equilibrium does not depend on market size, which does not enter equations (31)-(33'). 
The market size enters profits in (34) in a linear fashion. This means that after taking many 
draws of the productivity vector and computing expected profits in (34) for one market size, the 
solution for another market size is obtained in direct proportion. So for any choice of Me, it is 
fairly easy to find a market size R and fixed entry cost ke that result in Me being a long-run 
equilibrium.  
  Before turning to the computation of the equilibria, we can identify several analytical 
properties. The first property follows from our description above: 
 
Lemma 1 
The number of surviving firms M in the short-run equilibrium depends on the number of entering 
firms Me and their particular draws of marginal cost, but does not depend on the market size L. 
 
Notice that the market size does not enter into formulas (31)-(33'), which proves this Lemma. As 
we discuss in the next section, the number of entering firms in the long-run equilibrium certainly 
does depend on market size. With the doubling of market size, for example, then we will find 




that many of these firms do not survive for any draw of productivities, so that larger markets do 
not actually support more firms; instead, they will support more varieties per firm.  
  The result that larger markets support more varieties per firm can be seen from the 
optimal product range in (12) (which still holds with heterogeneous costs). Given a draw of 
productivities ) ,..., , ( ) M (
e M 2 1 e φ φ φ = φ  and a corresponding short-run equilibrium, Lemma 1 
tells us that changing the market size R =ρL will have no impact on the equilibrium market 
shares. Therefore, from (12) it is immediate that the product range for each market share will 
expand in direct proportion to the market size: 
 
Lemma 2 
Given the number of entering firms Me and their particular draws of marginal cost in a short-run 
equilibrium, the range of varieties produced by each firm is in proportion to the market size L. 
 
       What about the relationship between the product range and firms’ productivities? 
Differentiating (12), given a fixed market size R, shows that there is an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between market share and the number of products, where Nj reaches it maximum 
when the market share is: 





=                                                               (36) 
Lemma 3  
There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between firms’ productivities and the range of 





  To explain this result: more productive firms always have higher market share, as shown 
by (31); however, there is no monotonic relationship between firms’ productivity level and their 
choices on product range. From (27), having a higher market share means that firms are hurt 
more from the “cannibalization effect.”  For this reason, the incentive to expand product lines 
weakens as productivity rises. Thus, the relationship between productivity and the range of 
products is non-monotonic: firms at an intermediate level of productivity develop the largest 
range of products, while the most productive and least productive firms have smaller ranges. 
  We now turn to the numerical calculation of the long-run equilibrium to describe further 
properties of the model with heterogeneous costs. 
 
5.  Numerical Solution with Heterogeneous Costs 
          One key deviation of our model from the Melitz (2003) model with heterogeneous 
productivities is that in our case firms are no longer small relative the market. Dropping the 
assumption that firms are small enough relative to the market means that we can no longer use 
the law of large numbers to get closed-form solutions in the long-run equilibrium for the market 
aggregates such as the average productivity and the like. Nonetheless, the properties of the long-
run equilibrium can still be derived using a simple numerical experiment.  
           We follow steps described in last section in this numerical application. Specifically, we 
first choose the short-run number of entrants Me which is non-stochastic. Each of those Me 
entrants will draw a marginal cost parameter φ from a cost distribution with Pareto density 
γ φ φ = φ ) / ( ) ( F max , where we will arbitrarily let the upper bound of marginal cost  max φ = 5.  We 
also choose the shape parameter γ = 5 for now. Recall a larger shape parameter implies less 




The other key parameter is the elasticity of substitution between varieties η, we first set η = 6 
and will experiment with other values. For other parameters, we set the fixed costs of introducing 
each variety at  5 k1 = , and the sunk costs of entry at  10 ke = .  
           Table 1 gives an example of the short-run equilibrium where the non-stochastic number of 
entrants is fixed at Me = 7, given parameters as specified above. With 7 firms entering the market 
they are randomly assigned marginal cost parameters like those in the second column of Table 1. 
Then the remaining columns show the outcome of market competition. In this example, it turns 
out that only 5 firms survive, with the two highest-cost firms dropping out. It is clear from this 
example that market shares do not depend on market size, since from (31) to  (33), firms market 
shares only depend on their relative marginal costs to the cutoff firm and the cutoff firm’s market 
share. It is also clear that the profits and varieties are in direct proportion to the market size, 
which is exactly what is implied from (12) and (34).  
 
TABLE 1: A SAMPLE SHORT-RUN EQUILIBRIUM:  
PROFITS, VARIETY NUMBERS AND MARKET SIZE 
 







share  Profit  Varieties Profit Varieties Profit Varieties
1  3.580  0.489  67.085  14.048 134.169 28.095 268.338 56.191 
2  3.746  0.411  42.871  12.278  85.741  24.555  171.483  49.110 
3  4.214  0.067  0.797  2.213 1.594 4.426 3.188 8.853 
4  4.256  0.021  0.074  0.695  0.149  1.390  0.297  2.781 
5  4.264  0.012  0.025  0.405 0.050 0.809 0.100 1.618 




7  4.953  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: Parameters take the values  5 1 k = , 10 e k = , 5 = γ and  6 = η . 
 
 
          The short-run equilibrium in Table 1 is not necessarily a long-run equilibrium, because 
potential entrants may still see net benefits from entry. As long as the expected profits in the 




continues until Me reaches the point where adding one more entrants leads expected profits less 
than the entry costs. We illustrate the long-run equilibria with different market sizes in Table 2.  
 
TABLE 2: MARKET SIZE AND LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM NUMBER OF ENTRANTS 
 
Market size  Long-run number of 
entrants  Number of surviving firms 
R   Long-run Me M min M max M mean M median 
Expected profits 
Sunk cost ke=10 
4,000 64  2  6  3.00  3  10.63 
2,000 32  2  6  2.90  3  10.26 
1,000 16  2  7  2.97  3  10.32 
500 8  2  8  3.08  3  10.09 
     Note: Parameters take the values  5 1 k = , 10 e k = , 5 = γ and  6 = η , with 500 draws of marginal costs. 
 
          It is worth stressing the difference between Tables 1 and 2: while the short-run equilibrium 
in Table 1 is computed for a particular draw of marginal costs for the 7 firms, the long-run 
equilibria in Table 2 are computed for 500 draws of marginal cost for all entering firms. Then 
expected profits are computed as in (35), by averaging over firms and the draws of marginal cost. 
Of course, the number of surviving firms M can vary, depending on marginal costs, and that is 
why we report the minimum, maximum, mean and median of the distribution of M in Table 2. 
Indeed, we don’t take a stand on the question of which particular draw of marginal costs holds in 
“the” long-run equilibrium: if we extended our model by introducing dynamics with a death rate 
of firms, along with the entry of new firms, then the marginal costs would fluctuate over time 
due to entry and exit and there is no stationary, long-run equilibrium (in contrast to Melitz, 
2003). We avoid these dynamic issues, however, and simply solve for a long-run equilibria by 
determining the (non-stochastic) number of entering firms, as in Definition 2. 
  Table 2 shows that the long-run equilibrium number of entrants increases as the market 
size expands, and in fact, it increases in direct proportion. One reason for this result is that each 




that the free entry condition holds, the number of entrants must increase with the market size so 
that the expected net benefits from entry are close to zero. However, profits in (34) also depend 
on the market shares of firms, which differ with the marginal costs in each short-run equilibrium, 
so it is surprising that the increase in the number of entrants is in direct proportion to the market 
size. Interestingly, the equilibrium number of surviving firms in Table 2 is quite insensitive to 
the market size. This result is related to Lemma 1, that the number of surviving firms in a short-
run equilibrium does not depend on the size of the market, but we now find numerically that the 
same result holds when comparing the distribution of M across long-run equilibria.  
  With roughly the same distribution of the number of surviving firms M in markets of 
different size, but more entry in larger markets, it follows that more less-efficient firms must exit 
in larger market. Therefore, the surviving firms are expected to be of higher productivity. This 
result in confirmed in Table 3. In the upper panel of Table 3, we give the descriptive statistics 
(maximum, minimum, mean, median) of the highest marginal costs and highest prices for firms 
surviving in a long-run equilibrium. The lower panel of the same table gives the analogous 
descriptive statistics for the lowest marginal costs and lowest prices charged by firms surviving 
in a long-run equilibrium. It is clear from both panels that as market size expands, selection 
happens and the least efficient firms (with highest costs) drop out the market. The distribution of 
marginal costs and also prices is shifted to the left as the market size expands. 
 
TABLE 3: MARKET SIZE, MARGINAL COSTS AND PRICES 
 
Market 
size  Highest marginal cost  Highest prices 
R  φ min  φ max  φ mean  φ median  pmin p max P mean p median 
4,000  1.30 3.44 2.45 2.58 1.65 4.17 3.11 3.14 
2,000  1.42  3.94  2.80  2.82  1.89  4.74  3.49  3.50 
1,000  1.84 4.65 3.30 3.33 2.51 5.60 4.12 4.17 






size  Lowest marginal cost  Lowest prices 
R  φ min  φ max  φ mean  φ median  pmin p max P mean p median 
4,000  0.70 3.02 1.96 1.99 1.55 4.04 2.98 3.01 
2,000  0.69  3.40  2.22  2.23  1.85  4.62  3.36  3.36 
1,000  0.92 4.24 2.62 2.64 2.48 5.49 3.96 4.01 
500  1.02  4.43  3.00  3.07  2.18  5.83  4.52  4.60 
     Note: Parameters take the values  5 1 k = , 10 e k = , 5 = γ and  6 = η , with 500 draws of marginal costs. 
 
              
  With the selection effect shown in Table 3 operating, we expect that consumers are better 
off in larger countries. Reinforcing the selection effect is the impact of market size on the 
varieties produced and available to consumers. Table 4 gives statistics for the total number of 
varieties produced by all surviving firms and the aggregate market price index (as in (4')) in a 
long-run equilibrium. From the left columns, we see that the total number of varieties available 
roughly doubles as the market size doubles. From Table 2 we show that the distribution of the 
number of surviving firms remains roughly the same when market size changes, so each 
surviving firm produces more varieties on average to accommodate the integrated market while 
the highest-cost firms exit. Consumers gain from larger markets: they buy products at lower 
prices (Table 3), and they can also consume more varieties (Table 4, left columns). This leads to 
a drop in the aggregate price index, which is shown in the right-most columns of Table 4.  
 
TABLE 4: EQUILIBRIUM VARIETIES AND AGGREGATE PRICE INDEX 
 
Market size  Total Varieties  Aggregate price index 
R min  max  mean  median  Pmin P max P mean P median 
4,000 57.3  127.0  110.7  113.5  0.63  1.57  1.18  1.19 
2,000  28.2  63.6  55.7  56.8  0.83  2.05  1.52  1.53 
1,000 15.2  32.3  27.8  28.5  1.28  2.78  2.06  2.09 
500  6.0  15.9  14.0  14.3  1.29  3.38  2.70  2.74 





  We can think of the increase in market size as due to the integration of two economies 
through trade. In contrast to Melitz (2003), we have not introduced iceberg trade costs between 
the economies, and also do not have additional fixed costs of exporting. Without such costs, and 
assuming single-product firms with CES preferences, the integration of economies will have no 
impact on entry or exit in either country, even with heterogeneous firms (as shown by Bernard, 
Redding and Schott, 2007). But in our multi-product model, we have shown numerically that 
increasing the market size due to opening trade has several important impacts. These numerical 
results are summarized by: 
 
Proposition 2 
With a Pareto distribution of productivities and no fixed or iceberg costs of exporting, then 
increasing the market size through international trade leads to: 
(a) the world number of surviving firms roughly equal to the number of surviving firms in 
either country in autarky; 
(b) exit of the least efficient firms; 
(c) an increase in the range of varieties produced by each firm on average; 
(d)  an increase in expected consumer welfare due to both (b) and (c). 
 
  This Proposition is proved by the numerical calculations of long-run equilibria we have 
just reviewed. We have shown in Table 2 that the distribution of M is quite insensitive to the 
market size, which is the basis for part (a) of Proposition 2: each country will have roughly the 
same number of surviving firms in autarky, regardless of their respective markets sizes, and 
likewise for the world economy after integration. Part (b) follows from our numerical finding 




distribution of surviving firms M is quite insensitive to the market size: the larger number of 
entering firms means that the surviving firms are more efficient than otherwise, as shown in 
Table 3. Part (c) follow that insensitivity of the distribution of M to market size together with 
Table 4: since the total number of varieties produced in a country (or the world) increases in 
proportion to the market size, while the distribution of M is roughly the same, we expect more 
varieties per firm on average. Consumers gain from the expansion of product varieties and the 
fall in prices due to having more efficient firms. 
 
  We further demonstrate the numerical properties of our model by changing some of the 
key parameters. In each case, we will report results for two different market sizes, R = 1000 and 
R = 2000, to illustrate the effect of opening trade between two identical countries. This 
sensitivity analysis further confirms our numerical finding that the number of entering firms 
increased in direct proportion to the market size, and that the distribution of surviving firms is 
quite insensitive to the market size. 
 
TABLE 5: EQUILIBRIUM NUMBER OF ENTRANTS AND THE SHAPE PARAMETER 
 
R=1000  Number of surviving firms  R=2000  Number of surviving firms  γ 
Long-run Me  Mmin M max M ave M median Long-run  Me Mmin M max M ave M median 
1 44 2  4  2.11  2  88  2  4  2.10  2 
2  30  2  5  2.30  2  56  2  6  2.30  2 
4 18 2  7  2.80  3  37  2  6  2.87  3 
5  16  2  7  2.97  3  32  2  6  2.90  3 
10 10  2  9  4.17  4  20 2  10  4.14  4 
15  7  2  7  5.12  5  14  2  11  5.35  5 
20 6  2  6  5.45  6  11  3  11  6.30  6 
     Note: Parameters take the values  5 1 k = , 10 e k = , and  6 = η , with 500 draws of marginal costs. 
       
             
  We begin with the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution, γ, as shown in Table 5. 




density has a thinner right tail. When γ = 1, the cost parameter follows a uniform distribution. As 
γ rises, fewer firms enter the market, while the average number of surviving firms increases. 
When γ is quite large (for example, γ = 20), most of firms have high marginal costs and most of 
entrants will finally break even and stay in the market. When γ is large, potential firms face a 
larger probability of drawing high marginal costs, and so realized entry falls; on the other hand, 
for those who do enter the market, since the competitors are more likely similar to themselves in 
marginal cost, more firms could survive in the end. Thus, the number of entering firms falls with  
γ in Table 5, but the median number of surviving firms rises. 
  
TABLE 6: NUMBER OF ENTRANTS AND THE ELASTICITY PARAMETER 
 
R=1000  Number of surviving firms  R=2000  Number of surviving firms  η 
Long-run Me  Mmin M max M ave M median Long-run  Me Mmin Mmax M ave M median 
1.5 11 5  11  10.21  11  21 5  21  12.07  12 
2.0  14  3  14  7.2  7  28  3  15  7.00  7 
4.0 16 2  9  3.73  4  32 2  9  3.57  3 
6.0  16  2  7  2.97  3  32  2  6  2.90  3 
10 15  2  5  2.46  2  30 2  6  2.49  2 
15  15  2  5  2.27  2  30  2  4  2.27  2 
100 11 2  3  2.01  2  19 2  3  2.01  2 
         Note: Parameters take the values  5 1 k = , 10 e k = , and  5 = γ , with 500 draws of marginal costs. 
 
 
          Another important parameter, the elasticity of substitution, η, exerts its impact through 
affecting the intensity of competition and the price elasticity of demand. When η is low, varieties 
are less substitutable for each other, within a firm or across firms. Consequently, firms are able 
to charge higher markups and get higher profits. Larger η implies lower profits since it is easier 
for consumers to substitute among varieties, and so the median number of surviving firms is 
falling with η, as shown in Table 6. On the other hand, the movement of the number of entering 




explanation for this is that when η is low, the turning point for the most productive firm to 
restrict its range of products, shown in (36), is relatively low. This gives low-productivity firms 
more chance to survive in equilibrium. While on the other hand, if η is getting relatively large, 
the inverted U-shape between varieties and market shares leans to the right. In this case, even the 
largest firm won’t restrict its variety expansion since the “cannibalization” effect does not hurt as 
much. Therefore, little room is left for the high-cost firms to survive, so for high values of η the 
number of entering firms fall as η grows further.  
  
6. Conclusions 
  Recent literature has introduced multiproduct firms into monopolistic competition model 
with international trade. When CES preferences have been used, there has been a reluctance to 
recognize that firms with a positive mass of products will command extra market power: their 
elasticity of demand with respect to the common price of their varieties is less than the elasticity 
of substitution. As a firm’s range of varieties expands, the elasticity of demand falls further. The 
goal of this paper has been to show that it is both tractable and interesting to take into account 
these demand effects. We show that the optimal markup for a firm is endogenous, and that it 
faces a “cannibalization effect” in demand as more product varieties are introduced. The optimal 
range of varieties is obtained by balancing the profits earned from each (using the optimal 
markups) with the “cannibalization effect” of shifting demand away from its own products.  
  We model international trade as expansion of market size, as two formerly separate 
economies integrate frictionlessly into a larger, global economy. With multi-product firms, we 
find interesting effects of trade even in the absence of trade costs.  
            We first take our benchmark model with firms with identical marginal costs. This 




varieties, firms respond to free trade by expanding their product range of varieties. This occurs 
because as the market size grows due to trade, each firm’s market share decreases, which 
alleviates the cannibalization effect. Thus, firms tend to produce more varieties than they do in 
autarky. But not all firms can stay in the market, and there is exit in each country. Importantly, 
the expansion in varieties within the boundary of the firm dominates the fall in the number of 
local producing firms, so more varieties provided by (fewer) local producers. Consumers enjoy 
welfare gains because they not only have more domestic varieties, they also have more variety 
from imports, and because prices fall due to reduced market shares of each firm.  
             We then extend our benchmark model to incorporate heterogeneity in costs across firms. 
We show that in the short-run equilibrium, firms’ market shares do not depend on the size of the 
market, while firms’ variety ranges and profits are in direct proportion to the market size. Our 
numerical calculations confirm these predictions and also enable us to compute the long-run 
equilibrium. With heterogeneous costs, the number of firms surviving in equilibrium is quite 
insensitive to the market size. When trade is opened, more firms initially enter, but the larger 
market size reduces the cannibalization effect and expands the optimal scope of products. As a 
result, the less efficient firms exit, and the larger market is accommodated by more efficient 
firms that produce more varieties per firm on average. 
 





Proof of equation (20): 
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